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Abstract
Scientists have traditionally assumed that different kinds of mental states (e.g., fear, disgust, love,
memory, planning, concentration, etc.) correspond to different psychological faculties that have
domain-specific correlates in the brain. Yet, growing evidence points to the constructionist
hypothesis that mental states emerge from the combination of domain-general psychological
processes that map to large-scale distributed brain networks. In this paper, we report a novel study
testing a constructionist model of the mind in which participants generated three kinds of mental
states (emotions, body feelings, or thoughts) while we measured activity within large-scale
distributed brain networks using fMRI. We examined the similarity and differences in the pattern
of network activity across these three classes of mental states. Consistent with a constructionist
hypothesis, a combination of large-scale distributed networks contributed to emotions, thoughts,
and body feelings, although these mental states differed in the relative contribution of those
networks. Implications for a constructionist functional architecture of diverse mental states are
discussed.
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1. Introduction
During every waking moment of life, a human mind consists of a variety of mental states.
These mental states are typically named in commonsense terms, such as emotions (e.g., fear,
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disgust, love), cognitions (e.g., retrieving a memory, planning the future, concentrating on a
task), perceptions (e.g., face perception, color perception, sound perception), and so on.
Since the beginning of psychological science, researchers have assumed that each of these
words refers to a separate and distinct kind of mental category or “faculty” (Lindquist &
Barrett, under review; Uttal, 2001). Accordingly, scientists have searched for the physical
correlates of these mental categories for over a century—in behavior, in peripheral
physiology, and most recently, in a functioning brain. For example, cognitive neuroscientists
have attempted to identify the unified neural basis of fear (e.g., Whalen et al., 1998), disgust
(e.g., Wicker et al., 2003), love (e.g., Bartels & Zeki, 2000), the self (e.g., Northoff &
Bermpohl, 2004), episodic memory (Rugg, Otten, & Henson, 2002), semantic memory (e.g.,
Grossman et al., 2002), working memory (e.g., D’Esposito et al., 1998), face perception
(e.g., Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997) and so on. Twenty years of neuroimaging
research is revealing, however, that the brain does not respect faculty psychology categories
(Barrett, 2009b; Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Gonsalves & Cohen, 2010; Lindquist & Barrett,
under review; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss, & Barrett, in press; Pessoa, 2008; Poldrack,
2010; Uttal, 2001).
Instead of revealing domain-specific brain areas that are specific to each mental faculty,
growing evidence points to the hypothesis that diverse mental states emerge from the
combination of domain-general psychological processes or “ingredients” that map to large-
scale distributed networks in association regions of the brain (cf., Barrett, 2009b; Barrett,
2011). In psychology, there is a theoretical tradition for hypothesizing that mental states
emerge from the combination of more basic, domain-general, psychological processes—it is
known as a constructionist approach. Throughout the past century, the constructionist
approach has been most popular in models of emotion (e.g., Barrett, 2006, in press; Harlow
& Stagner, 1932; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, et al., in press; Russell, 2003; Schachter &
Singer, 1962; for a review see, Gendron & Barrett, 2009), although its roots can be found in
the earliest psychological writing (Dewey, 1895; James, 1890; Wundt, 1897/1998). The
essence of a constructionist approach is the idea that during every moment of waking life,
the brain constructs mental states such as emotions, body states, and thoughts by creating
situated conceptualizations (Barrett, 2006; Barsalou, 2009) that combine three sources of
stimulation: sensory stimulation from the world outside the skin (the exteroceptive sensory
array of light and vibrations and chemicals and so on), sensory signals from within the body
(somatovisceral stimulation, also called the interoceptive sensory array or the “internal
milieu”), and prior experience (also referred to as memory or category knowledge that the
brain makes available in part by the re-activation of sensory and motor neurons). These three
sources—sensations from the world, sensations from the body, and prior experience—are
continually available and the brain networks that process them might be thought of as part of
the basic ingredients that form all mental life. Different “recipes” (the combination and
weighting of the ingredients) are hypothesized to produce the myriad mental events that
people give commonsense names (i.e., “emotions,” “cognitions,” and “perceptions”). From
this perspective, mental categories such as emotions, cognitions, and perceptions are
populated by a diverse set of instances that are events to explain, not specific causal
processes linked to specific brain regions or networks.
There are three lines of work that support a constructionist functional architecture of mental
states. First, there is a growing appreciation in the neuroimaging literature that the same
networks have increased activation across a variety of different psychological task domains.
For instance, the “default network,” including regions of the medial prefrontal cortex,
medial temporal lobe, and posterior cingulate cortex, has increased activation during
emotion (e.g., Lindquist, Wager, Kober, et al., in press), emotion regulation (e.g., Wager,
Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008), representation of the self (e.g., Kelley et
al., 2002), mental state attribution to others (e.g., Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005), moral
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reasoning (e.g., Young, Scholz, & Saxe, in press), episodic memory and prospection (e.g.,
Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007), semantic processing (e.g., Binder, Desai, Graves, &
Conant, 2009), and even context-sensitive visual perception (Bar et al., 2006). The “salience
network,” including the insular cortex and anterior midcingulate cortex, has increased
activity during emotion (e.g., Lindquist, Wager, Kober, et al., in press), pain (e.g., Lamm,
Decety, & Singer, 2010), anxiety (e.g., Seeley et al., 2007), attention, language (see Nelson
et al., 2010), and time perception (see Craig, 2009). Even sensory brain areas that were once
thought to be unimodal and domain-specific (such as primary auditory and visual cortices)
respond to other sensory domains (e.g., auditory neurons show increased activity during the
presentation of visual stimuli; Bizley & King, 2008; visual neurons show increased activity
during the presentation of auditory stimuli; Cate et al., 2009). These findings suggest that
lack of support for faculty psychology is not merely an artifact of poor spatial or temporal
resolution in neuroimaging techniques.
In fact, meta-analyses that summarize the neuroimaging literature on mental categories such
as emotion, the self, memory, etc. confirm that brain regions show little psychological
specificity (at least for these categories or for their subordinate categories such as anger,
fear, disgust, the autobiographical self, self-referential processing, autobiographical
memory, semantic memory, etc.). For instance, our meta-analytic project on emotion
demonstrated that the amygdala (previously thought to be specifically related to fear),
anterior insula (AI) (previously thought to be specifically related to disgust), anterior
midcingulate cortex (aMCC) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (previously thought to be
specifically related to sadness and anger, respectively) each showed increased activity across
the experience and perception of many different emotions, indicating that increased activity
in these areas is not specific to any one emotion category (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, et al., in
press). Furthermore, during the experience and perception of emotion, there was increased
activity in areas typically involved in autobiographical memory and prospection, language
and semantics, and executive control (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; Kober, et
al., 2008; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, et al., in press). Meta-analyses assessing the neural
correlates of other mental states demonstrate a similar point. For instance, one meta-analysis
found that the same set of midline cortical areas that comprise the “default network”
(including the hippocampus, medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex) showed
increased activity in memory, prospection for the future, theory of mind, spontaneous
thought, and spatial navigation (Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009). Another recent meta-analysis
demonstrates that a similar set of regions within the dorsal prefrontal and parietal cortices is
involved across working memory, response selection, response inhibition, task switching
and cognitive control (Lenartowicz, Kalar, Congdon, & Poldrack, 2010).
A second line of evidence supporting the viability of a constructionist approach to the mind
comes from electrical stimulation and lesion studies. Electrical stimulation of the same site
within the human brain produces different mental states across instances (Halgren, Walter,
Cherlow, & Crandall, 1978; Sem-Jacobson, 1968; Valenstein, 1974). Even human lesion
studies are consistent with the idea that brain regions are not specific to any one mental
state. For instance, the speech disorder called Broca’s aphasia is caused by lesions that
extend beyond Broca’s area, the brain region thought to subserve speech production (Mohr
et al., 1978). As another example, amygdala lesions are not specifically associated with
deficits in fear-related processing. A patient with bilateral amygdala lesions (i.e., SM) has
difficulty perceiving fear on the faces of others (e.g., Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, &
Damasio, 1994; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1995; Adolphs et al., 1999), but
more recent findings suggest that patient SM is capable of perceiving fear when her
attention is explicitly directed to the eyes of a face (Adolphs et al., 2005) or when viewing
caricatures of fearful body postures (Atkinson, Heberlein, & Adolphs, 2007). These findings
suggest that the amygdala might be playing a more general role in attention to novel or
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motivationally relevant stimuli that contribute to fear, but that the amygdala is not specific to
fear (for discussions, see Cunningham & Brosch, in press; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, et al.,
in press).
Finally, the emerging science of “intrinsic networks” is consistent with the idea that the
brain’s functional architecture contains networks that correspond to domain-general
psychological processes rather than to specific mental state categories. By correlating low-
frequency blood-oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal fluctuations in the
hemodynamic response of voxels when a brain is “at rest” (i.e., when it is not being probed
by an external stimulus or engaging in a directed task), it is possible to identify large-scale
distributed networks that span frontal, cingulate, parietal, temporal, and occipital cortices.
These networks are highly replicable across studies that use different statistical methods and
are observed with both seed-based (e.g., Vincent, Kahn, Snyder, Raichle, & Buckner, 2008)
and other multivariate techniques (e.g., independent component analysis; ICA; Smith et al.,
2009) and cluster analysis (Yeo et al., 2011). These intrinsic networks are constrained by
anatomical connections (Buckner, 2010; Deco, Jirsa, & McIntosh, 2010; Fox & Raichle,
2007; Vincent, et al., 2008), so they seem to reveal something about the functional
organization that is fundamental to the human brain. Given that intrinsic activity accounts
for a large proportion of the brain’s metabolic budget (Raichle & Minton, 2006), it is
possible that these networks might be basic psychological “ingredients” of the mind.
Although a number of intrinsic networks have now been identified, none seem to map on to
the brain activity that corresponds to the categories in a faculty psychology approach (i.e.,
there appears to be no one network for “anger” or even “emotion” vs. “cognition”).
1.1 The Present Study
In this paper, we report a novel study testing a constructionist model of the mind where we
measured activity within large-scale distributed brain networks using fMRI as participants
generated three kinds of mental states (emotions, body feelings, or thoughts). We then
examined the similarity and differences in the pattern of network activity across the three
mental states. In our experiment, participants were exposed to a new scenario immersion
technique (Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011) that evokes mental
events as they happen in everyday life, allowing us to study the sort of subjective
experiences that are uniquely human (see also Frith, 2007). Psychology often assumes that
mental states emerge only when a person is probed by external stimuli (based on an old
model of the mind that was imported from physiology in the 19th century; Danziger, 1997).
Yet, mental states do not obey this classic stimulus-response model most of the time—
people do not need a stimulus in the physical world to have a rich and subjectively potent
emotion, feeling, or thought (e.g., Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). We tried to do justice to
this feature of mental life by using the scenario immersion technique as an ecologically valid
method that directs mental content, while keeping some of the unrestrained character of
subjective mental experience intact.
Participants heard sensory-rich, vivid, scenarios about unpleasant situations and were asked
to create a situated conceptualization during which each situation was experienced as a body
state (e.g., heartbeat, touch of an object against the skin, sights, smells, unpleasantness), an
emotion (e.g., fear, anger) or a thought (e.g., plan, reflection). At the beginning of each trial,
participants were cued to the type of mental state to construct on that trial. Following the
cue, participants heard a scenario as they constructed and then elaborated on a body state,
emotion, or thought. This imaging method was modeled after Addis and colleagues (2007)
who asked participants to “construct” and then “elaborate” on autobiographical memories.
We separately analyzed the scenario immersion and the construction + elaboration phases of
each trial as two events (scenario immersion, experience).
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Taking a network-based model of the mind as our starting assumption, we hypothesized that
mental states were constructed from the interaction of networks (Fuster, 2006; Goldman-
Rakic, 1988; McIntosh, 2000; Mesulam, 1998; also see Bullmore & Sporns, 2009), where
the psychological function of a set of brain areas exists in the functional interaction of those
areas. Specifically, we focused on the seven intrinsic networks recently identified by Yeo
and colleagues (2011); these networks were derived from the largest sample of participants
(N=1000) in any study of intrinsic functional connectivity to date and also replicate the
networks identified in other published reports (e.g., Fox et al., 2005; Seeley, et al., 2007;
Smith et al. 2009; Vincent, et al., 2008). Table 1 lists the brain regions that are found to
comprise each network across studies along with key papers that contribute to a functional
understanding of each network.
We hypothesized that the so-called “limbic network” supports the brain’s ability to generate
and/or represent somatovisceral changes that are experienced as the core affective tone that
is common to every mental state. Many philosophers and psychologists have proposed that
every moment of mental life has some affective aspect (e.g., Wundt, 1897) that can be
described as a combination of hedonic pleasure and displeasure with some degree of arousal
(Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Russell & Barrett, 1999). In our constructionist view, we
refer to this basic psychological element as “core affect” (Russell, 2003). Although the
limbic network outlined by Yeo and colleagues (2011) is limited to a relatively small area of
cortex (only covering the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral aspects of the temporal
cortex), several subcortical structures are also likely part of this limbic network. For
instance, we hypothesize that the nuclei of the basal ganglia are part of a “limbic” network
because they are involved in orchestrating effortful behavior (Salamone & Correa, 2002;
Salamone, Correa, Farrar, & Mingote, 2007) and motor control (Grillner, Hellgren, Menard,
Saitoh, & Wikstrom, 2005). Furthermore, the central nucleus of the amygdala and the
midbrain periaqueductal gray might be part of this network insofar that they are respectively
involved in producing autonomic responses (for a discussion see Barrett, Mesquita, et al.,
2007) and coordinating coherent physiological and behavioral responses (Bandler &
Shipley, 1994; Van der Horst & Holstege, 1998). It is important to note that the basal
ganglia, the amygdala, and the periaqueductal gray all project to the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC), which is one of the cortical regions within Yeo et al.’s limbic network.
We hypothesize that the “salience network” (referred to as “ventral attention” by Yeo et al.
2011), uses representations of affect to guide attention and behavior (see Lindquist &
Barrett, under review; Medford & Critchley, 2010). Importantly, the salience network
contains aspects of the dorsal anterior insular cortex and anterior mid-cingulate cortex
(aMCC), which are involved in executive attention (Corbetta, Kincade, & Shulman, 2002;
Touroutoglou, Hollenbeck, Dickerson, & Barrett, in press) and interoception (Critchley,
Elliott, Mathias, & Dolan, 2000; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004),
suggesting that this network is an important source of affective attention in the human brain
(Barrett & Bar, 2009; Duncan & Barrett, 2007). The salience network also contains aspects
of the ventral anterior insula that is involved in the experience of affective states
(Touroutoglou, et al., in press).
We hypothesize that the “default network” contributes to the representation or “simulation”
of previous experience and the retrieval of category knowledge to create situated
conceptualizations (i.e., to make meaning of somatovisceral changes in the body in relation
to the immediate context). We hypothesize that this network is key to the process of
reactivating relevant distributed brain regions to support category knowledge, memories,
and prospection of the future by directing sensory and motor regions. Posterior aspects of
the default network (e.g., posterior cingulate, precuneus, hippocampus) might be particularly
involved in the integration of visuospatial aspects of category knowledge (Cavanna &
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Trimble, 2006) whereas anterior aspects of the default network (e.g., mPFC) might be
involved in integration of the affective, social, and self-relevant aspects of category
knowledge (Gusnard et al. 2001).
The “frontoparietal network” plays an executive role by modulating activity in other
functional networks (i.e., prioritizing some information and inhibiting other information) to
help construct an instance of a mental state. The “dorsal attention network” plays a similar
role by directing attention, in particular, to visual information. We hypothesize that during
the scenario immersion task, these networks contributed to the executive control processes
involved in foregrounding certain types of information in conscious awareness to create one
type of mental state over another. For example, although conceptualization is important to
all states, it is particularly foregrounded in experiences of emotions and in thoughts. These
networks ensure that a mental state is experienced as unified (for a discussion see Lindquist,
Wager, Bliss-Moreau, Kober, & Barrett, in press).
Finally, “visual” and “somatomotor” networks are together involved in the representation of
visual, proprioceptive, and auditory sensations. We refer to these as “exteroceptive”
sensations because information from outside the body is represented as sounds, smells,
tastes, proprioception, and sights. We assume that these sensations are important during the
construction of all mental states.
Table 1 includes our hypotheses for each network’s involvement in body feelings, emotions,
and thoughts. First, we hypothesized that body feelings, emotions, and thoughts would
involve some degree of affect, conceptualization, and executive attention (Hypothesis 1).
Following this hypothesis, we predicted that the limbic network, the salience network, the
default network, and the frontoparietal network would be commonly engaged across a
conjunction of all mental states. Second, we hypothesized that a comparison of brain activity
across mental states would yield relative differences in the contribution of each ingredient to
each kind of state (Hypothesis 2). Specifically, we predicted that body states and emotions
engage the limbic and salience networks relatively more than would thoughts (Hypothesis
2a) (see Table 1). We also predicted that thoughts and emotions would engage the default
network relatively more than would body states, because we reasoned that conceptualization
would play a larger role in mental states where the representation of prior experiences is
necessary to make meaning of body sensations in the moment (i.e., emotion) or where
representation of prior experiences is being used to guide plans, associations, and reflections
about a situation (i.e., thought) (Hypothesis 2b) (see Table 1). Finally, we did not have a
priori predictions for how the frontoparietal, dorsal attention, somatomotor, and visual
networks would differ across the three classes of mental states.
2. Method
2.1 Participants
Participants were twenty-one right-handed, native English-speaking adults (12 females,
Mage = 26.42, SDage = 5.72). Participants gave written informed consent according to the
Partners Health Care Institutional Review Board and were paid up to $200 for their
participation. Potential participants indicated if they had a history of learning disabilities,
psychiatric illness, claustrophobia, cognitive dysfunction or alcohol/drug abuse in a phone
screening conducted prior to study enrollment. Participants who reported any of these
conditions were not enrolled in the study. Participants were also screened for use of
psychoactive or systemic medications and for MRI compatibility during this initial phone
screening. One participant was disqualified on the day of the study because she had taken
migraine medication that morning. The final sample was 20 participants (11 females, Mage =
26.40, SDage = 5.93). On the day of the experiment, participants also completed the 20-item
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Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) (Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994) and several other
self-report measures that are not relevant to the hypotheses discussed in this paper.
Alexithymia is a trait characterized by external thinking and difficulty identifying and
labeling one’s own emotions (Sifneos, 1973). No participants in our sample scored above
the cutoff for Alexithymia (cutoff = 61, MTAS = 38.57; SDTAS = 7.55). This finding ruled
out that any of our participants possessed traits that would cause them to have difficulty on
our mental state construction task.
2.2 Procedure
The present study used a new scenario immersion method developed in our lab and
previously used in neuroimaging research (Wilson-Mendenhall, et al. 2011). In this method,
participants are presented with scenarios that describe situations from a first person
perspective and are asked to imagine each scenario as if they are actually there. The
scenarios contain vivid sensory details so that participants can imagine the situation in a
multimodal manner, creating experiences that are high in subjective realism. The scenarios
used in this study described physical situations involving cars, boats, bikes, hiking, skiing,
food, drink, plants, and animals (see Table 2 for examples). Negative scenarios involved a
description of physical harm, whereas neutral scenarios described similar physical activities
where harm did not occur. The stimulus set consisted of both full scenarios and condensed
versions of the same scenarios. The condensed scenarios were shortened versions of the full
scenarios that still captured the gist of the situation and were presented during the scanning
session due to time limitations (see Table 2 for examples).
The experiment consisted of a training session outside the scanner and a testing session
within the scanner (following Wilson-Mendenhall, et al., 2011). Both occurred on the same
day. During the training session, participants listened to the scenarios to familiarize
themselves with the full scenarios and the condensed scenarios that they would later hear
during the scanning session. This procedure was used to enable participants to retrieve the
details of the full scenario when presented with the condensed version in the scanner.
Participants also received detailed instructions about the construction task during the
training session. Participants were told that the construction task was designed to assess the
brain basis of different mental experiences. Before they would hear the condensed scenario,
a cue would appear to instruct them which mental state they were to create in reaction to the
scenario. In the BODY condition, participants were asked to create a body sensation in
response to the situation described in the scenario. During the training session, the
experimenter gave examples of a variety of internal somatovisceral sensations and instructed
the participant how to create and attend to those sensations in reaction to the scenario (see
Supplementary Materials for detailed instructions). In the EMOTION condition, participants
were asked to create a specific emotion in response to the situation described in the scenario.
The experimenter gave examples of several specific emotions (anger, fear, sadness) and
instructed the participant how to create and attend to those emotional experiences in reaction
to the scenario. In the THOUGHT condition, participants were asked to create a thought in
response to the situation described in the scenario. The experimenter explained that a
thought involved objectively reviewing a situation and reasoning about what is happening
without cultivating any feelings or emotions. We also included a PERCEPTION condition,
in which participants were asked to create a sensory perception in response to the situation
described in the scenario. The experimenter instructed the participant to take note of the
objects in the scene and the relationship between them without analyzing them or having an
emotion or feeling. After the researcher ensured that the participant understood the task
instructions in the training phase, participants completed 8 practice trials in which they
practiced constructing all four mental experiences.
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During the scanning session, participants were presented with 36 negative scenarios and 12
neutral scenarios. Every trial started with a 2 second cue phase to instruct participants which
mental state they were to create in reaction to the scenario. The negative scenarios were
randomly combined with three different cues so that 12 were experienced as body states, 12
as emotions, and 12 as thoughts. Participants were instructed to experience the 12 neutral
scenarios as perceptions, so that they would not habituate to negative scenarios across many
presentations. Data from the perception trials were not included during analysis. The task
was broken up into three 12.6-minute runs, each presenting 16 scenarios in random fashion.
The instructions and scenarios were presented over headphones; the cues and fixation cross
were presented on a screen that was made visible through a mirror mounted on the head coil.
The task was presented using the stimulus software package ‘Presentation’
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc).
After the cue phase, participants heard a condensed version of the scenario for 10 seconds
(scenario immersion phase). During this phase, participants were instructed to use the
condensed version to “experience the scenario from the point of view of the particular
mental state you were cued with.” Following the scenario immersion phase, participants
entered the experience phase where they constructed and elaborated on the mental state to
experience it as intensely as possible without changing it or thinking about or experiencing
anything else. Participants pressed a button to indicate when the mental state had been
constructed and that they had begun elaboration (see Addis, et al., 2007). The experience
phase (construction + elaboration) was 20 seconds total. After the experience phase ended,
participants judged the vividness of their experience and the extent to which they were
successful in creating the assigned experience. Ratings were made on a continuous scale
from 0 (“not at all”) to 10 (“100%, completely”). The inter-stimulus interval was set at 4 sec
during which a fixation cross was displayed in the center of the screen.
2.3 Imaging details
The imaging data were collected at the Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical
Imaging using a 3T Siemens Magnetom Trio and a 12-channel matrix head coil. Participants
were restricted in head movement through the use of expandable foam cushions and wore
MRI-safe headphones through which they heard the scenarios.
Each scanning session started with an automated scout image and shimming procedures.
Then, structural T1-weighted multi-echo MEMPRAGE images (van der Kouwe, Benner,
Salat, & Fischl, 2008) were acquired (TR = 2530 ms, TE1 = 1.64 ms, TE2 = 3.5 ms, TE3=
5.36 ms, TE4 = 7.22 ms, flip angle = 7°, with single-shot, interleaved acquisition and a
voxel size of 1.0 × 1.0 × 1.0 mm). After the structural run, a 6-minute resting state
functional sequence was acquired, which will not be discussed further in this manuscript.
Next, three functional runs followed that each acquired 378 T2* weighted functional
volumes (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 90°, FOV = 200 mm, with interleaved
slice acquisition and a voxel size of 3.1 × 3.1 × 4.0 mm). The total duration of the scanning
session was a little over an hour. After the functional runs, an 8-minute diffuser sensor
imaging (DSI) sequence was acquired, which we do not discuss further.
2.4 Data analysis
The functional and structural data was preprocessed and analyzed using Freesurfer 5
(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/). Structural preprocessing followed the standard
Freesurfer protocol for cortical surface and volume reconstruction and parcellation,
including automated Talairach transformation, intensity normalization, skull stripping, white
matter segmentation and registration to a spherical atlas using a high-dimensional non-linear
registration algorithm (Dale, Fischl, & Sereno, 1999; Fischl, Sereno, & Dale, 1999; Fischl,
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Sereno, Tootell, & Dale, 1999). Functional preprocessing included motion correction, spatial
smoothing (5mm kernel) and registration of the functional images onto the anatomical scan.
After preprocessing, individual time series were modeled with a canonical hemodynamic
response function (gamma function, hemodynamic delay 2.25; dispersion 1.25). The design
matrix included motion regressors and second order polynomial nuisance regressors. Time-
points with movement exceeding 2 mm were excluded from the analysis. A preliminary
analysis demonstrated that the experience phase did not show any significant differences
between construction and elaboration so we analyzed it as a single 20-second event
(construction + elaboration). We modeled the hemodynamic response function (HRF) for
the cue phase, scenario immersion phase, experience phase, and the judgment phase
separately. Subsequently, we performed a random effects analysis on the group level to
calculate contrast maps.
2.5 Cortical parcellation
To identify the seven intrinsic networks of interest in our analysis, we used the surface-
based network labels made available in Freesufer by Yeo and colleagues (2011). These
networks were derived from the analysis of resting state data in 1000 healthy young adults.
Yeo et al. employed a clustering approach to identify networks of functionally coupled
regions across the cerebral cortex. Their 7-network solution was highly consistent across
analyses, with 97.4% of the vertices being assigned to the same network across a discovery
and a replication data set. The parcellation of the cortical surface into specific regions was
based on the Desikan-Killiany cortical atlas (Desikan et al., 2006). In addition to surface-
based functional analyses, we also report findings from within the subcortical volume using
subcortical labels provided by Freesurfer (Fischl et al., 2002).
2.5.1. Hypothesis testing—To investigate Hypothesis 1 that all mental states (body
states, emotions, thoughts) would involve some degree of representation of the current state
of the body, conceptualization, and executive attention, we estimated the common network
engagement for emotions, body feelings, and thoughts during the experience phase with a
conjunction analysis. We focused specifically on the experience phase, because in contrast
to the scenario immersion phase, there was no external stimulus present in this phase.
Hence, the conjunction reflects patterns of activation that are commonly recruited when
people generate specific mental content and focus on their internal world without any
external stimulation. The conjunction analysis for the scenario immersion phase, which
shows common activation during listening to and immersing oneself in a scenario across
mental state conditions, is presented in Tables 3-4 in the Supplementary Materials. Each
conjunction analysis was implemented by taking the minimum of the absolute value in each
vertex across the body focus vs. fixation, emotion vs. fixation and thought vs. fixation
contrasts. Subsequently, we identified clusters within the conjunction that spanned at least
100 continuous vertices all reaching a significance threshold of p < .001. We also performed
a conjunction analysis of the volume, focusing specifically on subcortical structures,
identifying clusters that spanned at least 20 continuous voxels all reaching a significance of
p < .0001 (see Table 4 in Supplementary Materials).
To examine Hypothesis 2 that networks would contribute differentially to each kind of
mental state, we first performed region of interest (ROI) analyses using Yeo et al.’s network
labels. Each of Yeo et al.’s networks were converted to each participant’s individual cortical
surface using spherical space as an intermediate registration space. From the resulting seven
ROIs, each representing a network of interest, we extracted beta weights (percent signal
change) for each contrast comparing a mental state against fixation (scenario immersion and
experience separately). These beta weights were analyzed with a one-factor (mental state)
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repeated measures analysis of variance with three levels (body, emotion, thought).
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests are presented if the sphericity assumption was not met.
Simple effects significant at p < .05 are presented in the text when the main effect reached
significance.
As another test of Hypothesis 2, we performed contrasts between the three categories of
mental states across the whole cortical surface. This allowed us to directly compare mental
states without involving a comparison against fixation. Comparisons against fixation may
have limited the chance to find differences in engagement of the default network in the
conjunction analysis and ROI analysis (see Stark & Squire, 2001). In addition, whole brain
contrasts allowed us to examine whether the ROI results reflected the engagement of one
single sub-region within each network, or whether results indeed reflected a distributed
network. We localized clusters of activity using the surface-based labels from Yeo et al.
(2011) and the surface Desikan-Killiany cortical atlas (Desikan et al., 2006). We compared
the three mental state categories across the scenario immersion and the experience phases
separately. To correct for multiple comparisons, we performed a semi-automated Monte
Carlo simulation implemented in Freesurfer 5. This method performs simulations to produce
an estimation of the distribution of maximum cluster size under the null-hypothesis.
Following this method, we identified clusters with a vertex-wise threshold of p < .01 and a
cluster-wise threshold of p < .05 (i.e., clusters that have a probability lower than the
threshold of p < .05 to appear during the null-hypothesis simulation). In addition to clusters
on the surface of the brain, we report subcortical clusters with a threshold of p < .001
(uncorrected) and a cluster size of k > 20.
3. Results
3.1 Response time and subjective ratings
An analysis of the button press response times in seconds demonstrated a significant
difference between mental states, F(2, 38) = 3.98, p < .05, η2 = .17. Simple effects showed
that participants constructed bodily feelings (M = 1.95, SD = 1.27) significantly more
quickly than they constructed emotions (M = 2.61, SD = 1.28) and marginally more quickly
than thoughts (M = 2.47, SD = 1.48). Yet, as expected, participants did not report
differences in the ability to construct each type of state. Participants were equally successful
in constructing body feelings (M = 7.2, SD = 1.4), emotions (M = 7.3, SD = 1.3), and
thoughts (M = 7.2, SD = 1.5) during the task, F(2, 38) = .07, ns. In addition, participants
rated their body feelings (M = 7.5, SD = 1.2), thoughts (M = 7.5, SD = 1.1) and emotions (M
= 7.3, SD = 1.1) as being equally vivid, F(2, 38) = .47, ns. There were no sex differences in
ratings of the success [Mmales = 7.23; SDmales= 1.15; Mfemales = 7.17; SDfemales = 1.65; F(1,
18) = .03, p = .86] or vividness [Mmales= 7.23; SDmales= .75; Mfemales = 7.37; SDfemales =
1.50; F(1, 18) = .07, p = .80] of mental state construction. Together, these findings confirm
that all participants were able to successfully construct robust and vivid mental states during
the scenario immersion procedure.
3.2 Hypothesis 1: Networks common to emotions, body feelings, and thoughts
To test Hypothesis 1, we performed a conjunction analysis for the experience phase of the
experiment (for an overview of the significant clusters see Table 3). As predicted, we
observed common engagement of regions within the salience network (representing
affective attention), the default network (conceptualization) and the frontoparietal network
(executive control) across all three kinds of mental states (Figure 1). In the salience network,
we observed large clusters of activation in the superior frontal gyrus, supplementary motor
area (SMA) and the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC), bilaterally. Furthermore, we
found clusters of activation in the bilateral dorsal anterior insula (AI), bilateral pars
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opercularis (BA 44), and the left temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). In the default network, we
observed increased activation within the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and the pars triangularis
(BA 45). In the frontoparietal network, we found clusters of activation in the left
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC, BA 46). See Supplementary Materials Table 3 for
activations observed during scenario immersion.
Contrary to predictions, we did not find common engagement of regions within the cortical
limbic network during the experience phase. However, a conjunction analysis targeting
subcortical regions revealed common activations in aspects of the basal ganglia
hypothesized to comprise the limbic network (left pallidum and putamen) as well as bilateral
cerebellum across mental states in the experience phase (see Table 4). Parts of the limbic
network, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the ventral and medial
temporal lobe are especially susceptible to signal dropout because of proximity to the
sinuses. A close inspection of these regions in our study indeed showed signal dropout in
these areas, which would explain why the cortical aspects of the limbic network did not
show robust activation in our analyses. As a result, our hypotheses regarding the role of the
cortical limbic regions in mental states could not be fully addressed in the present study.
The conjunction analysis also showed activation in the somatomotor network and the dorsal
attention network for which we did not formulate specific predictions. Within the
somatomotor network we found a cluster in the left precentral gyrus; within the dorsal
attention network we found clusters in the bilateral precentral gyrus and left superior parietal
regions.
Notably, we only found deactivations (relative to fixation) in the occipital lobe during the
experience phase. This is consistent with our prediction that experiences of emotions,
thoughts, and bodily feelings recruit the default network. The absence of significant
deactivations in the default network is relevant to this prediction since robust activity in the
default network is also observed when participants engage in spontaneous thought during
undirected tasks, such as fixation (Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010). See Supplementary
Materials Table 3 for deactivations observed during scenario immersion.
3.3 Hypothesis 2: Relative differences in the involvement of networks across mental states
3.3.1 Network ROI analyses—To test Hypothesis 2, we performed a ROI analysis using
the seven distributed networks as separate ROIs and examined differences in percent signal
change extracted from each network across mental state conditions (see Table 5 in the
Supplementary Materials for a full overview of the means and standard errors; also see
Supplementary Materials Table 1 for a summary of correlations between self-report ratings
of success and vividness and percent signal change in the salience network and default
network across conditions and Supplementary Materials Table 2 for a discussion of the non-
significant sex differences in network involvement across the three mental states). All
simple effects are significant at p < .05 unless explicitly noted. Consistent with Hypothesis
2a that some states would involve a relatively greater contribution of core affect than others,
the salience network demonstrated differential activation for emotions and body feelings vs.
thoughts. This difference occurred primarily during the scenario immersion phase where we
found a significant main effect of mental state in both the left, F(2, 38)= 5.33, p < .01, η2= .
22, and the right hemisphere, F(2, 38)= 3.36, p < .05, η2= .15 (see Figure 2). As predicted
by Hypothesis 2a, simple effects demonstrated a significantly stronger involvement of the
salience network in body feelings and emotions compared to thoughts in the left hemisphere.
In the right hemisphere, the comparison between emotions and thoughts reached
significance, whereas the comparison between body feelings and thoughts approached
significance (p < .06). Furthermore, as predicted, emotions and body feelings did not differ
in the degree to which they involved the salience network (all p > .4). Activation in the
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salience network did not differ between mental state conditions in the experience phase, F(2,
38) = .75, p = .45 (lh); F(2, 38) = .24, p = .70 (rh).
The cortical aspects of the limbic network ROI did not show any robust differences between
the three mental states. We found no differences between conditions during scenario
immersion, F(2, 38) = .79, p = .46 (lh); F(2, 38) = .25, ns, p = .73 (rh). During the
experience phase we found a marginally significant main effect of mental state for the left
hemisphere, F(2, 38)= 2.83, p = .07, η2= .13, but not for the right hemisphere, F(2, 38)=
2.13, p = .13. Simple effects showed significantly stronger engagement of the limbic
network in thoughts compared to body feelings. One interpretation of these findings is that
participants were not experiencing or representing robust shifts in the peripheral nervous or
endocrine systems that are controlled by regions within the limbic network. Another
possibility is that the cortical sites of the limbic network (to which this analysis was limited)
did not show differential activity across mental states because of signal dropout in the
regions comprising Yeo et al.’s limbic network. The whole-brain analyses including
subcortical structures are consistent with this latter interpretation since we found relative
differences in activity in aspects of the basal ganglia across mental states. We discuss these
findings in the whole-brain analyses below.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, the default network was differentially involved across
mental states during the experience phase. Both the left hemisphere, F(2, 38) = 5.34, p < .01,
η2 = .22, and the right hemisphere, F(2, 38) = 4.39, p < .05, η2 = .19, demonstrated a
significant main effect of mental state (see Figure 2). Simple effects demonstrated a
significantly stronger involvement of the default network in thoughts compared to emotions
and body feelings across both hemispheres. Emotions and body feelings did not differ from
each other in the degree to which they involved the default network (all p > .5). The default
network did not differ between body feelings, emotions and thoughts during scenario
immersion, F(2, 38) = 1.56, p = .23 (lh); F(2, 38) = .69, p = .46 (rh).
The frontoparietal network demonstrated differential activation for emotions, body feelings
and thoughts during the scenario immersion phase, specifically in the left hemisphere, F(2,
38) = 4.63 p < .05, η2 = .20. The right hemisphere demonstrated a marginally significant
main effect of mental state, F(2, 38) = 2.72, p = .09, η2 = .13, ε = .78. Simple effects
demonstrated a significant difference between body feelings and thoughts in the left
hemisphere, such that there was greater involvement of the frontoparietal network in body
feelings than thoughts. This finding could reflect the attention required to focus inward on
one’s internal sensations while constructing body states. The comparison between body
feelings and thoughts in the right hemisphere and between emotions and thoughts in the left
hemisphere approached significance (p =< .09). All other simple effects did not reach
significance (all p > .12). Activation in the frontoparietal network did not differ between
mental state conditions in the experience phase, F(2, 38) = 1.79, p = .18 (lh); F(2, 38) = .90,
p = .42 (rh), suggesting that executive attention contributes equally to mental states once
they are constructed.
The dorsal attention network differed between body feelings, emotions and thoughts during
the scenario immersion phase, both in the left, F(2, 38) = 3.34, p < .05, η2 = .15, and the
right hemisphere, F(2, 38) = 3.62, p = .05, η2 = .16, ε = .76. Simple effects demonstrated
that body feelings and emotions had significantly stronger engagement of the dorsal
attention network than thoughts in the left hemisphere. In the right hemisphere, emotions
differed significantly from thoughts, whereas the comparison between body feelings and
thoughts approached significance (p < .06). Emotions and body feelings did not differ from
each other in involvement of the dorsal attention network (all p > .4). These findings suggest
that the dorsal attention network plays a role in mental states in which sensory information
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from the body is attended to (i.e., in body states and emotion). They are interesting in that
the dorsal attention network has traditionally been associated with executive control
processes for exteroceptive sensory information (i.e., visual sensations; see Corbetta &
Shulman, 2002). Activation in the dorsal attention network did not differ between mental
state conditions in the experience phase, F(2, 38) = 1.27, p = .29 (lh); F(2, 38) = .79, p = .46
(rh).
Finally, we found no significant main effects concerning the visual network ROI and the
somatomotor network ROIs.
3.3.2 Whole brain analyses—In addition to the ROI analyses, we performed whole
brain contrasts to examine the extent to which different sub-regions within each network
showed relatively different patterns of activation across mental states. For the scenario
immersion phase, the significant clusters per contrast, including the relevant network
parcellation(s), are presented in Table 5 and Figure 3. Contrasts with significant clusters in
subcortical regions are presented in Table 4. For the experience phase, the significant
clusters per contrast, including the relevant network parcellation(s), are presented in Table 6
and Figure 4.
As predicted (Hypothesis 2a), we found that body feelings demonstrated increased activity
compared to thoughts in several regions within the salience network that is hypothesized to
represent core affective feelings to guide attention and behavior. There were significant
clusters of activation bilaterally in the dorsal AI, left vlPFC (including pars opercularis), and
bilateral superior frontal gyrus (including the right aMCC) during the scenario immersion
phase. Emotions also demonstrated increased activity compared to thoughts within regions
of the salience network during scenario immersion (Hypothesis 2a). We found significant
clusters in the left vlPFC, the right aMCC (extending into the frontoparietal network), the
superior frontal gyrus bilaterally (extending into the dorsal attention network) and the right
supramarginal gyrus (extending into the dorsal attention network). Body feelings and
emotions did not have increased activity compared to thoughts in regions within the cortical
limbic network, although they did have differential activity in some subcortical structures
hypothesized to comprise the limbic network. Body feelings had a greater increase in the left
thalamus (extending into the pallidum) and the right caudate (extending into the thalamus
and pallidum) than did thoughts during the scenario immersion phase. Emotions did not
have greater activity than thoughts or body states in any subcortical structures, although they
interestingly showed greater activity in the cerebellum than did thoughts. The contrast
analysis yielded no significant clusters of activation within the salience network and the
limbic network when comparing body feelings to emotions. This finding suggests that a
similar degree of core affect is created when someone is attempting to experience a scenario
from the point of view of body activity or from the point of view of more specific emotions.
Consistent with our predictions, the contrasts comparing thoughts to body feelings and
thoughts to emotions did not show any significant clusters within the salience network or the
limbic network during the scenario immersion phase.
During the experience phase, body feelings involved stronger engagement of regions within
the salience network than emotions, specifically within the left supramarginal gyrus
(extending into the frontoparietal network). Since this cluster extended into the
frontoparietal network, one interpretation of this finding is that it reflects heightened
attentional control as participants continue to experience body states following construction.
None of the other contrasts produced significant clusters within the networks supporting
core affect.
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In contrast to our predictions, we found no differences in activation within regions of the
default network between body feelings, emotions, and thoughts in the scenario immersion
phase, except for one cluster in the dmPFC that demonstrated greater activation for emotions
than thoughts. Yet, as predicted (Hypothesis 2b), we observed greater involvement of
regions within the default network when we compared thoughts to body feelings in the
experience phase. In particular, thoughts involved relatively greater activity in the left and
right superior temporal gyrus, the left precuneus, and the left medial prefrontal cortex than
body states. Also consistent with Hypothesis 2b, we found that thoughts showed stronger
activation of regions within the default network than emotions. Significant clusters were
present in the left and right superior temporal gyrus and the left medial prefrontal cortex.
Finally, and consistent with our predictions (Hypothesis 2b), we found that emotions
showed increased activity compared to body feelings in an aspect of the default network, the
left anterior temporal lobe. The contrasts comparing body feelings and emotions to thoughts
did not show any significant clusters.
We did not have specific predictions for how the frontoparietal network, dorsal attention
network, somatomotor network or visual network would contribute differentially to body
states v. emotions v. thoughts. During the scenario immersion phase, we found that both
body feelings and emotions demonstrated stronger involvement of regions within the
frontoparietal network than thoughts, specifically within the dlPFC and superior frontal
gyrus. During the experience phase we found a similar effect in regions of the frontoparietal
network when comparing body feelings to thoughts, specifically within the supramarginal
gyrus and pars triangularis. When comparing thoughts to emotions in the experience phase,
we found one significant cluster in the superior frontal gyrus within the frontoparietal
network. In terms of the dorsal attention network, we found stronger engagement of the left
precentral gyrus when comparing body feelings to thoughts during scenario immersion.
Furthermore, emotions demonstrated stronger involvement of the dorsal attention network
than thoughts, specifically within the superior parietal lobule, superior frontal gyrus,
supramarginal gyrus and the postcentral gyrus. We found two large clusters of activation in
temporal regions within the somatosensory network when comparing emotions to body
feelings in the scenario immersion phase. Moreover, emotions demonstrated stronger
involvement of regions in the somatomotor network than thoughts, specifically within the
paracentral and precentral gyrus. Finally, concerning the experience phase, thoughts
demonstrated stronger involvement of the postcentral gyrus (somatomotor network)
compared to body feelings, and stronger involvement of the left inferior parietal lobe (visual
network) compared to emotions. See Table 7 for a summary of findings in support of
Hypotheses 1-2.
4. Discussion
To our knowledge, the present neuroimaging experiment is the first to explicitly test a
constructionist functional architecture of the mind by assessing both similarities and relative
differences in the neural correlates of body feelings, emotions, and thoughts. Our findings
support the constructionist hypothesis that mental states are best understood by examining
relative differences in the engagement of distributed networks that support psychological
processes that are engaged to create a variety of mental states. These findings directly call
into question the faculty psychology view that different classes of mental states differ
categorically at the level of brain organization. In addition, our scenario immersion method
provides a new avenue for using fMRI to understand the basic building blocks of the mind.
4.1 Mental states share common psychological “ingredients”
We found evidence that body feelings, emotions and thoughts, although subjectively
distinct, each involve the participation of the same distributed brain networks that can be
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described in relation to basic psychological processes. Where possible, we have derived
knowledge about the function of a network from the literature, but the field is only in the
earliest stages of discussing the psychological functions of intrinsic networks. As a result,
previous research that provides clear functional descriptions in terms of psychological
processes of the networks is scarce (with an exception of the default network; e.g., Buckner
& Carroll, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Spreng, et al., 2009). There are,
however, many studies about the individual brain areas within each network. In discussion
of our findings, therefore, we discuss the functions of the separate regions that comprise the
networks to motivate an understanding of the network’s involvement, as a whole, in basic
psychological process that contributes to all mental states.
4.1.1 Salience network—One of our most notable findings was the common involvement
of the salience network across body feelings, emotions, and thoughts. We hypothesized that
the salience network supports representations of affective states to guide attention and
behavior (Lindquist & Barrett, under review; Medford & Critchley, 2010). This hypothesis
is consistent with findings that the salience network shows increased activity in tasks
requiring the allocation of attention to evocative or behaviorally relevant stimuli (Corbetta,
Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Nelson, et al., 2010; Seeley, et al.,
2007). As identified by Yeo et al., the salience network is comprised of the anterior and mid-
insula, posterior aspects of the vlPFC (pars opercularis), aspects of the anterior midcingulate
cortex (aMCC) and the anterior aspect of the TPJ (supramarginal gyrus). In our study, we
found increased activity specifically in the aMCC, supplementary motor area (SMA), the
dorsal part of the anterior insula (AI), pars opercularis (BA 44), and the left temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ) across all mental states. We will discuss each of these results in turn.
The result that bodily feelings, emotions and thoughts collectively engaged the SMA is
consistent with the role of the SMA in internally driven action (Nachev, Kennard, Husain,
2008). This pattern of activity may reflect motor processes associated with the button press
through which participants indicated that they had constructed a mental state during the
experience phase.
Our finding that the TPJ is engaged across all mental states is consistent with studies that
show increased activity during feelings of agency over one’s own body (for reviews, see
Decety & Grezes, 2006; Tsakiris, Constantini, & Haggard, 2008) and when representing
someone else’s body state (as during empathy Lamm, et al., 2010). Indeed, increased
activity in TPJ is often observed when one person engages in theory of mind— or attempts
to understand the contents of another’s mind—in general (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003).
The result that the AI and aMCC were engaged across mental states is consistent with
studies that show activation of these regions during interoception (Critchley et al., 2003;
Critchley, et al., 2004) and subjective experiences more generally (Craig, 2002, 2009).
Indeed, a recent meta-analysis found increased activity in regions comprising Yeo et al.’s
salience network (including the AI, aMCC, vlPFC, thalamus and amygdala) during the
experience of unpleasant core affect (Hayes & Northoff, 2011). Another recent paper linked
many of these same regions (ventral AI, thalamus, and amygdala) to the experience of
affective arousal while viewing negative images (Touroutoglou et al. in press). Our findings
were consistent with both these studies in that we found activity in similar regions within the
salience network to scenarios that were unpleasant and highly arousing. Our findings thus
cannot speak to whether the salience network is involved in all core affective states since we
did not include positive scenarios in our study. However, we did find increased activity in
aspects of the AI and aMCC to pleasant core affective states in a previous meta-analysis
(Wager, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, Lindquist, Duncan, Kober, et al. 2008), consistent with our
hypothesis that regions comprising the salience network are linked to the experience of all
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core affective states. The relative role of the salience network in unpleasant v. pleasant core
affect should be the topic of future research.
In terms of our findings concerning the AI, it is important to note that the salience network
(called “ventral attention” by Yeo et al., 2011) used in the present study covered both dorsal
and ventral aspects. There is some evidence in the literature, however, that the AI can be
functionally dissociated into dorsal v. ventral aspects, with dorsal aspects being functionally
connected to the aMCC and relatively more involved in tasks where body information is
used to guide attention (Kurth, Zilles, Fox, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010; Touroutoglou, et al., in
press; Wager & Barrett, 2004). Ventral aspects of the AI, by contrast, are functionally
connected to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and are relatively more involved in tasks
where core affective feelings are experienced (Hayes & Northoff, 2011; Touroutoglou, et
al., in press; Wager & Barrett, 2004). The activations we observed in the AI were primarily
in the dorsal portion, which may reflect the role of this area in sustained attention towards
salient information (see Lindquist & Barrett, under review; Medford & Critchley, 2010;
Seeley et al., 2007). Such salience may have been especially important in our immersion
task because participants switched attention between different sources of information (e.g.,
internal sensations v. external sensations) when they actively created mental states.
Our findings suggest that representations of body sensations play a role beyond the
experience of physical sensations in the body or affective states such as emotions. In any
situation where people are presented with evocative or behaviorally relevant information,
the salience network will guide the direction of attention based on body sensations,
irrespective of whether people are directed to experience an emotion or objectively think
about the situation. This finding is consistent with several recent suggestions in the literature
that body cues are a ubiquitous component of mental life, including in states involving
perception (Barrett & Bar, 2009; Cabanac, 2002), judgment (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007),
tasks involving effort (Critchley, et al., 2003), and in consciousness more generally (Craig,
2009; Damasio, 2000). This finding is also consistent with recent research demonstrating
that the representation of emotion concepts involves simulations of affective and body states
(Oosterwijk, Rotteveel, Fischer, & Hess, 2009; Oosterwijk, Topper, Rotteveel, & Fischer,
2010) and with research that suggests that representations of body states are involved when
participants understand verbal descriptions of “cognitive” states (e.g., thinking,
remembering or sudden insight) (Oosterwijk et al., 2012).
4.1.2 Limbic network—Contrary to our prediction, our findings did not reveal robust
activation in the cortical aspects of the limbic network as identified by Yeo et al (2011)
during the experience of body feelings, emotions, and thoughts. Our analyses did
demonstrate engagement of subcortical parts of the limbic network that are less susceptible
to signal drop out, specifically in the pallidum and putamen, however. Research suggesting
that the basal ganglia play a role in motivated behavior (Graybiel, 2005, 2008) is consistent
with the hypothesis that these structures are involved in the generation of core affective
states. For instance, basal ganglia function shows a relationship with symptom severity in
disorders in which affect generation is impaired. In particular, the degree of basal ganglia
connectivity to other areas within the putative core affect generation network such as
ventromedial prefrontal cortex is related to symptom severity in depression (Marchand et al.,
2012) and lesions to the basal ganglia result in greater incidence of depression following
stroke than lesions elsewhere in the brain (Morris, Robinson, Raphael, & Hopwood, 1996;
Vataja et al., 2004).
The amygdala, another subcortical structure in our putative limbic network, did not have
increased activity in our study. Although the amygdala is assumed to be generally involved
in emotion, a closer look at the literature reveals that amygdala activity is more likely to
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occur during the sensory perception of behaviorally relevant stimuli than during the
internally-focused experience of affective mental states, as occurred in our task (for meta-
analyses, see Costafreda et al. 2008; Lindquist et al. in press). Consistent with our findings,
a recent study failed to document increased amygdala activity when participants experienced
social stress in the scanner (Wager et al. 2009).
4.1.3 Default network—We found common involvement of the default network across
mental states, consistent with the hypothesis that this network is necessary for constructing a
situated conceptualization that creates a body state, emotion or thought. The hypothesis that
the default network supports conceptualization is consistent with the role of the default
network in mental state attribution (Mitchell, et al., 2005), emotion experience (Kober, et al.,
2008; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, et al., in press), recollection of the autobiographical past
(Addis, et al., 2007; Spreng & Grady, 2010), spontaneous thought (Andrews-Hanna,
Reidler, Huang, & Buckner, 2010) and semantic and conceptual processing (Binder, et al.,
2009; Visser, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2010). We hypothesize that what unites these
disparate domains is the process of conceptualization—in which representations of prior
experiences are brought to bear to construct representations of the past, the future, or the
present moment. These regions are necessary to give meaning to others’ actions, to make
meaning of one’s own core affective state, to recall prior experiences during instances of
memory and spontaneous thought, and to represent the meaning of concepts by simulating
category instances (for a discussion, see Lindquist & Barrett, under review; Lindquist,
Wager, Kober, et al., in press).
The default network, as identified by Yeo et al., is comprised of aspects of the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), aspects of the pars triangularis and the pars orbitalis, the superior
temporal lobe, angular gyrus, and aspects of the precuneus. In our study, we found a
common involvement of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and the pars triangularis (BA 45),
across body feelings, emotions, and thoughts. These regions have been particularly
associated with semantic processing (Binder et al. 2009; Visser et al. 2010) and may reflect
a sub-network (see Yeo et al. 2011, 17-network parcellation; Smith et al. in press) within the
default network that specifically supports language (Lindquist & Barrett, under review;
Smith et al. in press). Notably, our conjunction analysis did not yield an increase in activity
in the entire default network. Neither, however, did our conjunction analysis yield any
significant decreases within core regions of the default network, suggesting that bodily
feelings, emotions, and thoughts engaged the default network to the same degree as the
spontaneous thought that is observed during fixation (Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010). Since
many core regions in the default network (e.g., mPFC, PCC) show increased activation
during fixation and thus appear as decreased activity during other tasks (hence the name
“default” network; Raichle et al., 2001), we likely placed ourselves at a disadvantage to find
a robust increase in the default network during mental state construction by comparing task
activity to fixation. Consistent with this interpretation, we found the predicted activation in
classic default areas (e.g., mPFC, PCCC) in our contrast analyses (reported below) when we
compared one type of mental state to another.
4.1.4 Frontoparietal network—We found common involvement of an aspect of the
frontoparietal network across body states, emotions and thoughts, suggesting that all these
mental states involve executive attention. Brain areas within this network tend to have
increased activity during “top-down control” of attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), as in
“memory maintenance” (Cole & Schneider, 2007), “rule representation” (Crone,
Wendelken, Donohue, & Bunge, 2006), and “planning” (Fincham, Carter, van Veen,
Stenger, & Anderson, 2002). We hypothesize that this network modulates activity in other
functional networks to help construct an instance of a mental state. Activity within this
network may reflect the cognitive control needed to instantiate the processes of
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conceptualizing core affect. The frontoparietal network, as identified by Yeo et al., is
comprised of aspects of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, aspects of the cingulate cortex, the
frontoinsula and aspects of the inferior parietal lobule and precuneus. In our study, there was
increased activity within the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex across body feelings, emotions,
and thoughts.
4.2 Different profiles or “recipes of ingredients” contribute differently to different mental
states
Although the same distributed brain networks were implicated in body feelings, emotions
and thoughts, we also found evidence that different network profiles were associated with
each mental state category. Compared to thoughts, body feelings involved relatively greater
increases in activity in the salience network (i.e., dorsal anterior insula bilaterally, left vlPFC
including pars opercularis, and the right aMCC). Emotions also demonstrated increased
activation in the salience network compared to thoughts (i.e., in the left vlPFC, the right
aMCC and the right TPJ), albeit in slightly different areas. Additionally, body feelings
engaged subcortical regions hypothesized to be involved in core affective generation, such
as the thalamus, pallidum, and caudate, to a greater extent than thoughts.
Compared to body feelings, emotions involved relatively greater involvement of the default
network, specifically in the left anterior temporal lobe (ATL). Aspects of the ATL are part
of the default network and have been linked to the representation of concept knowledge
(Binder, et al., 2009; Visser, et al., 2010). These findings imply that the experience of an
emotion, as compared to a body state, is characterized by stronger involvement of the
process of conceptualization to make meaning of body sensations in the moment. These
findings are consistent with behavioral findings demonstrating that concepts like “anger” or
“fear” are used to shape body sensations into the experience of an emotion (e.g., Lindquist
& Barrett, 2008a). Similarly, cortical thinning in ATL due to neurodegenerative disease
impairs patients’ ability to perceive emotional facial expressions as instances of discrete
emotional feelings (e.g., anger v. fear) (Lindquist, Gendron, Barrett, & Dickerson, under
review).
Thoughts also demonstrated greater engagement of the default network (bilateral superior
temporal gyrus, left precuneus and left mPFC) as compared to body feelings. Furthermore,
several regions within the default network, including the left and right superior temporal
gyrus and the left mPFC, demonstrated relatively greater increases in activity when
participants generated thoughts than when they generated emotions. This finding is
consistent with our proposal that conceptualization plays a greater role in mental states
where people need to plan, associate, and reflect on a situation (thought) than in a mental
state where the focus is on body sensations. Moreover, this finding also suggests that
thought may involve the process of conceptualization to a stronger extent than emotion. This
interpretation is consistent with the default network’s robust involvement in memory and
predicting the future (Addis, et al., 2007), theory of mind (Spreng & Grady, 2010), semantic
memory (Binder, et al., 2009; Visser, et al., 2010) and other so-called “cognitive” mental
states involving the representation of prior experiences.
The specific combination of activation in regions within the default network and regions
within the salience network (as evident from the conjunction analysis) during thought and
emotion is consistent with a recent study that demonstrated connectivity between regions of
the default network (rTPJ, vmPFC and PCC/precuneus), aspects of the salience network
(anterior insula, SMA, aMCC) and the primary sensorimotor cortex during mentalizing tasks
(Lombardo et al., 2009). Interestingly, this connectivity pattern occurred both when
participants were mentalizing about the self, and when they were mentalizing about others,
suggesting an overlap between two processes that have been separated in the literature.
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According to the authors, this pattern of connectivity suggests an interaction between
“embodied/simulation based representations” and areas that support “high-level inference
based mentalizing.” This view is consistent with a constructionist view that representations
of sensorimotor and somatovisceral sensations combine with conceptualization to create
specific mental content. Future research should assess the degree to which the salience
network and default network differ in terms of functional connectivity across emotions vs.
body states vs. thoughts. For example, one hypothesis is that seed regions within the salience
network and the default network show greater connectivity during emotions and thoughts
(which require more conceptualization) compared to body feelings.
Although we did not have a priori hypotheses about the relative involvement of the
frontoparietal network across mental states, we did observe that this network was relatively
more engaged when people focused on their body feelings than when people generated
emotions. This finding provides some insight for a better understanding of disorders that
involve extreme body vigilance (e.g., panic disorder and anxiety symptomatology; Schmidt,
Lerew, & Trakowski, 1997). Increased activity in the frontoparietal network could also be
interpreted as evidence that participants had more difficulty creating body sensations than
creating emotions or thoughts in our task, although their subjective ratings did not support
this interpretation.
4.3 Implications
The present findings represent a somewhat different functional architecture of the basic
building blocks of the human mind than what is assumed in a faculty psychology view. In
contrast to traditional faculty psychology approaches that have been popular in cognitive
neuroscience over the past three decades, our findings suggest that it is fruitful to take a
constructionist framework when attempting to understand how the brain instantiates mental
states, in which thoughts and feelings emerge from the combination of intrinsic networks.
These networks can be described in terms of basic, domain-general psychological
ingredients (such as core affect, conceptualization, executive attention, and exteroceptive
sensation) that can be observed as elements across of the variety of mental states that make
up the human mind. Our results suggest that as part of this functional architecture, it is
productive to focus on broad-scale intrinsic neural networks when interpreting functional
neuroimaging data. This idea is consistent with the growing call for a network-based
understanding of the brain’s functions (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009; Fuster, 2006; Goldman-
Rakic, 1988; McIntosh, 2000; Mesulam, 1998; Pessoa, 2008). Our results also emphasize
the importance of examining distributed patterns of brain activation to understand mental
states with different content, rather than focusing on single regions. In the most extreme
version of this approach, psychological function exists as the functional interaction of those
areas, so that isolated regions serve different psychological functions depending on what
they are connected to during a given instance. In future directions, it will be important to use
multivariate methods (e.g., McIntosh, Bookstein, Haxby, & Grady, 1996), functional
connectivity analyses, and other neuroinformatic approaches that allow researchers to
understand how individual brain regions are working together to instantiate basic
psychological processes during mental states.
Second, the present findings shed new light on the function of specific brain regions as they
contribute to broad-scale functional networks. For example, we found increased activation in
the area known as the TPJ across all mental states in our study. Yet, TPJ is sometimes
referred to as the “neural correlate” of perceiving other’s minds with the assumption that it
consistently and specifically performs a neural computation for theory of mind (Saxe &
Kanwisher, 2003; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). Our findings suggest that TPJ
is unlikely to play such a specific role (for a similar view see Mitchell, 2008), since aspects
of it (e.g., supramarginal gyrus) are part of the larger salience network in which we observed
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increased activity during the generation of one’s own mental states (rather than just
reflecting on other’s experiences) (for another discussion, see Decety & Grezes, 2006). If
the salience network (including the TPJ) is engaged (at least in part) in the representation of
core affect, then this would explain its involvement across tasks involving both the
generation and perception of mental states. In studies of mental state perception in others
(i.e., theory of mind), TPJ might have increased activity because other people are salient
stimuli (and hence are represented as having core affective value) (Mitchell, 2008).
Alternatively, simulations of another person’s core affective state may be necessary when
trying to understand what they are thinking and feeling (i.e., theory of mind relies on
embodiment of affective states; Lombardo, et al., 2009). Still other aspects of the TPJ
(angular gyrus) are part of the default network involved in conceptualizing. One possibility
is that the role of TPJ depends on its “neural context,” in which a brain area’s function
depends on the other areas to which it is functionally connected at a given point in time
(e.g., McIntosh, 2000). Another possibility is that there are different functional sub-regions
of TPJ that separately contribute to core affect and conceptualization. This framework for
understanding a brain area’s function also applies to other areas that showed increased
activity in our study (e.g., MPFC, aMCC, insula) that have been attributed to specific mental
states in the literature (e.g., self-referential processing; Kelley, et al., 2002; e.g., conflict;
Kerns, 2004; e.g., disgust; Wicker, et al., 2003).
4.4. Limitations
The findings of the present study produced questions that could be the topic of future
research. For example, an unexpected finding was that differences between mental states
occurred across different phases of the experimental task. For instance, differences in
activity within the salience network were most pronounced between mental states when
participants were immersing themselves in the scenario. By contrast, the experience phase
did not show differences within the salience network between body feelings, emotions, and
thoughts, suggesting that all mental states involved affective processes to the same extent
during the experience phase. It is possible to understand these results by considering that
bodily feelings where constructed faster than were emotions and thoughts. Participants
might have started the construction of bodily feelings early in the immersion phase,
corresponding to a stronger engagement of the salience network during immersion and a
shorter response time during the experience phase. Nevertheless, this interpretation does not
explain the stronger engagement of the salience network during the immersion phase for
emotions. Another possible interpretation of this finding is that cueing participants to
experience a body state or emotion caused them to attend to the body and affective details of
a scenario at the exclusion of other details whereas in thought they attended to the non-body/
affective details. We cannot rule out this interpretation given the parameters of the study
design. One means of clarifying this question in future studies would be to prevent
participants from seeing the cue until after they hear the scenario. Yet a third interpretation
of this finding is that body feelings and emotions engage the salience network more so than
thought, but only during the initial moments of the experience (e.g., when it is initially being
constructed) and not as the experience persists over time. That is, the relative involvement of
different distributed networks during the production of mental states may not be dependent
on the type of mental state alone—it may also depend on the time course of the state. This
question is the topic of future research.
Another finding from the present study that deserves more experimental attention is the
finding that body states and thoughts were more distinct from one another than they were
each from emotions. Although it is possible that our emotion manipulation was just less
robust than the other experimental conditions, or that participants did not adequately create
emotions in reaction to the scenarios, this interpretation is not supported by our self-report
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findings. Participants reported that they had just as much success creating emotions as body
states and thoughts, and that they experienced emotions just as vividly as other states. Future
studies should ask participants to rate the specificity with which they experienced each state
on a trial-by-trial basis. A final interpretation of this finding, and the one predicted a priori
by our constructionist view, is that, by design (rather than by experimental failure), emotions
share many of the “ingredients” that also comprise both body states and thoughts. We have
proposed (Barrett, 2006) and demonstrated (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008a) elsewhere that
emotions are states that are at once affective and conceptual. Future studies should continue
to explore the extent to which emotions are mental states that consist of both affective and
conceptual ingredients.
Finally, a limitation of the present study is that it did not measure individual differences in
cognitive abilities that might have constrained participants’ ability to construct mental states.
One hypothesis of a constructionist framework is that individuals with greater working
memory capacity will be better able to access relevant conceptual information and inhibit
irrelevant conceptual information during the construction of mental states (Barrett, Tugade
& Engel, 2004; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008b). In the future, it would thus be interesting to
model the extent to which individuals with greater working memory capacity are not only
more successful at such a task, but also more likely to have discrete and robust mental states
in general.
4.5 Future Directions
In the present paper, we attempted to describe each intrinsic network in psychological terms.
It is important to acknowledge that these psychological descriptions are a first hypothesis
and are only a starting point. In future research, it will be important to continue to define and
refine the constructionist framework that we have laid out in this paper and elsewhere
(Barrett, 2006, 2009; Barrett et al., 2007; Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007; Barrett,
Mesquita, et al., 2007; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008a, 2008b; Lindquist, Wager, Bliss-Moreau,
et al., in press; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, et al., in press; Wilson-Mendenhall, et al., 2011).
The best psychological descriptions for existing networks will no doubt change as data
accrues over time. Perhaps the goal moving forward is to describe the psychologically most
basic “common denominators” that will link a range of findings across task domains that
appear very different on the surface (cf., Lindquist & Barrett, under review). For example,
defining the salience network as a functional group that represents core affective
information from the body to guide attention and behavior not only explains the role of this
network in emotion, but also in focal attention, performance monitoring, language, sensory
processing, and consciousness more generally (for reviews see Craig, 2009; Nelson, et al.,
2010). It is important to note that a constructionist framework does not merely rename
networks to fit one particular theoretical view. Instead, it attempts to provide functional
descriptions of distributed networks that distill many years of neuroimaging research on
emotion, memory, thought, semantics and so on, to shed new light on how the mind maps
onto the brain.
Analysis of intrinsic networks remains an important direction of future research as the
science attempts to identify the most basic common denominators of psychological
experience. For example, explicitly modeling time has allowed researchers to identify
spatially distinct intrinsic networks that are also maximally distinct in terms of their
temporal dynamics (Smith et al., in press). Smith et al. demonstrate, for example, that the
default network can be further parsed into temporally-defined sub-networks that might each
have distinct psychological functions (e.g., language v. representing prior experiences). With
such refinements, researchers will be better equipped to discover the building blocks of
mental states.
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Finally, although a construction approach is still underspecified, and further elaboration and
refinement is crucial, our findings add to a growing literature suggesting that faculty
psychology should be discarded as a scientific framework for understanding how the brain
creates the mind. The findings from our study demonstrate that the brain cannot be parsed
into different territories for different mental faculties that map to unique mental experiences
in a one-on-one fashion. As emergent phenomenon, mental states with distinct
phenomenology, such as body feelings, emotions and thoughts are not necessarily localized
to distinct regions (or even networks) within the human brain. Humans have the capacity to
experience a wide variety of mental states, and it is only by studying this variety that we will
be able to finally understand the basic building blocks that constitute them.
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Conjunction for experience phase across body feelings, emotions and thoughts.
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Region of interest analyses demonstrating differential involvement of the default network
and the salience network across different mental states for the scenario immersion and the
experience phase. Graphs represent percent signal change, bars represent standard error. * p
< .05
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Left and right hemispheres (lateral and medial view) with activation patterns for emotions >
body feelings, body feelings > thoughts and emotions > thoughts for the scenario immersion
phase. Clusters of vertices are significant at p < .01 corrected for multiple comparisons
(Monte Carlo).
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Left hemispheres (lateral and medial view) with activation clusters for body feelings>
emotions, emotions > body feelings, thoughts > body feelings and thoughts > emotions for
the experience phase. Clusters of vertices are significant at p < .01 corrected for multiple
comparisons (Monte Carlo)
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Table 1
Overview of seven networks of interest












(although Yeo et al.’s
network
only covers the cortex, we
also






of the amygdala will be a part
of
this network).
• emotion and affect (Lindquist et al., in
press; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010)




control of the body to create
core affective feelings
of pleasure or displeasure
with some degree of
arousal.
Hypothesis: Body feeling
and Emotion > Thought
“salience network”
(Seeley et al., 2007) or
“ventral attention










(AI) and mid-insula, frontal





• cognitive control(Cole & Schneider,
2007)
• stimulus-driven control of attention
(Corbetta& Shulman, 2002)
• set maintenance (Dosenbach et al.,
2006)
• maintaining sub-goals (Fincham et al.,
2002)
• anxiety (Seeley et al., 2007)
• representation of the body (Craig,
2009)
• pain (Lamm et al., 2010)
body-directed attention:
using representations from
the body to guide attention
and behavior. This
ingredient might use
changes in the homeostatic
state










Vincent et al., 2008;
















• prospection(Spreng& Grady, 2010)
• theory of mind(Spreng& Grady, 2010)
• moral reasoning (Greene at al., 2001)
• context-sensitive visual perception
(Bar, 2004)
• spontaneous thought (Andrews-Hanna
et al., 2010)
• emotion (Lindquist et al., in press;
Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010)
• semantics, phonology, sentence




(i.e., memory or category
knowledge) to make
meaning of sensations from
the body and the world
in the moment.
Hypothesis: Thought and









• task-switching (Crone et al., 2006)
• alerting to a stimulus after a cue (Fan
et al., 2005)
• planning (Fincham et al., 2002)
executive attention:
modulating activity in other
ingredients to create a
unified conscious field
during
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Network Brain regions Task domains Psychological description
and hypotheses
Vincent et al., 2008;
Yeo et al., 2011) or
“executive
control network”
(Seeley et al., 2007)
lobe, inferior parietal sulcus,
and
aspects of the middle
cingulate
cortex (mCC)
• rule-specific processing (Sakai
&Passingham, 2006)
• working memory (Sakai
&Passingham, 2003)
the construction of a mental
state (e.g., selecting
some conceptual content










Shulman, 2002; Yeo et
al., 2011;)





• top-down control of visuospatial attention
(Corbetta et al., 2002)
visuospatial attention:
modulating activity in an
ingredient for processing
visual content in particular
(e.g., selecting which visual














• audition (Morosan et al. 2001)















Note: The table lists the brain regions that are found to comprise each network across studies (column 1), the references that contribute to a
functional understanding of each network (column 2) and the psychological description that is supported by the network as hypothesized by a
constructionist framework (see further Lindquist & Barrett, under review).
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Table 2
Two examples of the full and condensed versions of the negative scenarios used in the experiment (based on
Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011).
Full Version Full Version
You’re driving home after staying out drinking all
night. The long stretch of road in front of you
seems to go on forever. You close your eyes for a
moment. The car begins to skid. You jerk awake.
You feel the steering wheel slip in your hands.
You’re biking through a park without a helmet.
Everywhere you look, people are picnicking and
playing. The front tire hits a pot hole. You sail
over the handlebars. Your head slams into the
concrete surface. You can feel blood trickling
down your face.
Condensed Version Condensed Version
You’re driving home after staying out drinking all
night. You close your eyes for a moment, and the
car begins to skid.
You’re biking through a park without a helmet.
Your front tire hits a pot hole, and you sail over the
handlebars.
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Table 7
Summary of findings
Hypothesis Analysis showing support
1: Common networks involved in
emotions, body feelings, &
thoughts
Conjunction: involvement of salience network, default network and frontoparietal
network across emotion, body and thought
2: Relative differences in network
involvement across emotion, body,
& thought
2a: Body & emotion > thought for
limbic network and salience
network
ROI: body = emotion > thought for salience network in scenario immersion phase
Contrast: body > thoughts for salience network during scenario immersion
Contrast: emotion > thoughts for salience network during scenario immersion
Contrast: body > thoughts for limbic during scenario immersion
2b: Emotion & thought > body for
default network
ROI: thought > emotion = body for default network in experience phase
Contrast: thoughts > body in default network during experience phase
Contrast: thoughts > emotion in default network during experience phase
Contrast: emotion > body in default network during experience phase
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